the leadership can ensure that local notables with large local followings are represented within an assembly of autocratic elites. 2 Barbara Geddes writes that the elections serve two purposes. First, the ruling elites aim to win with
While the Western media downplayed the elections, among comparative political scientists a small but growing body of literature has suggested that even staged-managed elections in authoritarian regimes actually serve a political purpose. Robert Taylor discusses their role in providing legitimacy for the ruling elite but also concedes, in line with Ellen Lust-Okar, that elections serve as a mode of distributing rents to important constituencies. Carles Boix and Milan Svolik argue that elections are a mechanism by which supermajorities, thus bolstering their legitimacy and sending a costly signal to potential challengers. Second, the elections serve as an informationgathering mechanism, allowing the leaders to see who the potential challengers might be. 3 Vietnam expert Matthieu Salomon provides some suggestions regarding the purpose of the elections in Vietnam as part of his analysis of the NA's role in the political system. He argues that the elections serve as a "popularity contest" between party members and that the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) leaders pay close attention to the percentages won by Central Committee members. 4 This would suggest that the hypotheses of Boix and Svolik as well as Geddes regarding the informational aspects of elections holds some currency. We will return to these academic theories over the course of the article to help frame events taking place in Vietnam, but save a rigorous test of their applicability for future work.
The aim of this particular article is to provide a detailed account of the 2007 election in Vietnam that offers background for students of Vietnam and those interested in political institutions in single-party states. It will also clarify the discussion among Vietnam scholars regarding the degree to which the influence and effectiveness of the NA has grown in recent years.
Although many scholars have touched on the role of the NA in policy making, few have examined in great detail the institutional design of the body and the electoral process. Given the academic interest in elections in authoritarian regimes in general and the increasing role of the Vietnamese NA in particular, we believe a detailed discussion of the election process and institutional structure is imperative.
The article is divided into six sections. We first survey the literature regarding the power of the NA and the role of the elections vis-à-vis the Vietnamese polity. Second, we use previous research and our own analysis of the structure and power of the NA to determine the stakes for being nominated and winning election. Third, we discuss the nomination process and election procedures under the 2007 Election Law. Fourth, we study the variety of mechanisms used by central leaders to ensure that the "right" candidates were elected and that the NA composition conformed to the preplanned structure. Fifth, we analyze the electoral outcomes and assess their implication for Vietnamese politics. Finally, we discuss the special role of self-nominees in the election and the special challenges they posed for election commissions trying to operate within the parameters set by central officials.
Our research is bolstered by a set of eleven detailed field interviews with NA representatives, candidates, and Vietnamese political analysts conducted in the summer of 2007, immediately after the elections. We employ the field interviews in conjunction with a detailed, biographical database of the 493 delegates and 876 candidates. In addition, we gathered data on 120 selfnominees, 5 including many who were not selected for the final ballots. To these two major tools we add a comprehensive review of Vietnamese press coverage of the candidate selection procedures, elections, and leadership decisions of the NA.
Based on this analysis, we draw two main conclusions. First, due to its organizational structure and election vetting process, the NA-despite the improved procedures for self-nomination and the historic rejection of central nominees-is still largely controlled by the central VCP leadership and remains severely limited in its capacity to oversee the government. The NA's hierarchical structure ensures that the candidates representing local perspectives and particular interest groups have far less influence within the NA than the candidates nominated by the central party-state apparatus.
The likelihood that the NA delegates reflect the will of the voters is also reduced by the "paint-by-numbers" manner in which the central party-state leadership preplans the composition of the NA. 6 We will show how the electoral system is used to ensure that the NA reflects this structure within a process designed to appear democratic in terms of increased representativeness and electoral competition. We will then demonstrate how the election results suggest that the leadership remains capable, despite increasing difficulty, of achieving its preplanned "canvas" in most cases. In particular, only one self-nominated candidate was elected in 2007, and the final NA looked strikingly similar to the structure proposed by the leadership before any candidates were even nominated.
The second conclusion we draw is that the most recent elections do pro- Within this vein, Thayer believes the 2007 changes in the number of fulltime representatives will perpetuate the gradual increase in the NA's influence. 10 While discussing the increased importance of the body, most scholars also acknowledge the limits to its authority. Harrington writes that while the 1992 revision provided for professional delegates, it did not fundamentally alter party control over legislation. 11 Indeed, article 4 of the Constitution explicitly states that the party remains the leading force in Vietnam.
Southeast Asia and Vietnam specialists Martin Gainsborough, David
Koh, and Matthieu Salomon directly address the election procedures. 12 Salomon's piece focuses on the "power and representation" of the NA and, In recent years, a number of Vietnamese scholars and practitioners have turned their lenses on the role of the NA in the Vietnamese polity.
These pieces differ slightly in tone from those of foreign scholars, as they are less concerned with objectively analyzing the policy and electoral processes. Vietnamese scholars focus their attention on highlighting core deficiencies in the workings of the NA and advocating change. Nguy#n Aeng Dung, in his magisterial account of the Vietnamese administrative structure, spends a chapter analyzing ways to recover the constitutionally mandated responsibility of the NA over the government apparatus, which he acknowledges has improved over time but does not meet the standards set forth in the 1992 Constitution. 13 Nguy#n S3 D:ng, deputy secretary general of the NA, takes a comparative tack-holding up the NA to parliaments in other countries and to the comparative political science literature. He offers a range of suggestions for how to enhance the capacity, responsibilities, and representativeness of the institution by drawing on myriad international examples. 14 LMu Ven QuOng of the H7 Ch5 Minh National School of Political Science carefully diagnoses how voting for multiple candidates per district within a single-party system undermines the principles of representation and competition in the founding documents of the NA and the writings of H7 Ch5 Minh. He doesn't call for a multiparty system, but he does advocate augmenting intra-party competition by opening up the self-nomination process to increase the number of candidates, while simultaneously restricting the number of delegates that can be elected per district. 15 power between delegates within the NA, revealing that the reward for election is far greater for some delegates than others. The fact that most candidates know whether they will be included in the body's leadership prior to the election has a considerable effect on the lure of winning.
In sum, we find that the incentives for candidates can vary based on who nominates them, the likely role they will take within the NA, and their position outside the NA. Our analysis reveals that for many candidates, especially those nominated at the provincial level, nomination is a duty rather than an honor. Furthermore, because of the low pay and the weakness of the NA as an institution, the perks of elected office derived from power or rents are not particularly high, which also limits the incentive to win election.
However, despite the low stakes for many candidates, once nominated, all
candidates have an incentive to win by as a high a percentage as possible in order to avoid embarrassment and maintain standing within the VCP.
the role of the national assembly
According to the 1992 Constitution, the NA has two main roles. First, it serves as a representative body of the people. To this end, its membership has been carefully engineered to ensure that ethnic minorities, women, and the various sectors within the Fatherland Front are represented. Secondly, it is supposed to be the most powerful body in the state owing to its exclusive role in passing laws and overseeing government. These roles were explicitly delineated by Nguy#n Ven An, former NA chairman, in his essay on democracy. He wrote that the NA represents the democratic voice of the people.
The people exercise indirect democracy through the NA, and they exercise direct democracy in electing the delegates. Furthermore, the people oversee the actions of the government through the NA. The people, through the NA, are meant to be a check on the government, by which Nguy#n Ven An meant the prime minister's office and line ministries. 16 However, most Vietnamese watchers believe that historically the VCP takes over these responsibilities and that the NA has been primarily a rubber stamp for decisions already decided upon by the government or the party. As noted above, scholars have debated how much these powers have grown since the 1992 constitutional revision. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the NA has in fact taken on more responsibilities, particularly regarding its oversight of the government and in drafting laws. However, several factors continue to inhibit its development as a viable "veto gate" in Vietnam policy making. 17 The Constitution itself limits the power of the NA delegates. Individual NA delegates only have the power to introduce comments or a petition about legislation that has already been introduced. 18 Only high-ranking government leaders can introduce legislation directly. 19 Furthermore, as we will show below, the NA's oversight and lawmaking capabilities are circumscribed by its lack of information and limited delegate experience.
The NA has in fact taken on more responsibilities since the 1992 revision, particularly in overseeing the government by amending draft laws in the committees and questioning officials. Its oversight role has most notably expanded through the introduction of televised query sessions, where government ministers must field questions from the full body of the NA. Under Nông A+c Mfnh, the chairman of the NA in the 1990s, and then Nguy#n Ven An, the query sessions were televised so that Vietnamese citizens could see government leaders taken to task publicly. The state-run media publicizes these sessions widely and even hypes them a bit, referring to the question-and-answer sessions as the ghC nóng [hot seat]. These sessions can actually result in pointed questions, particularly when the minister being questioned is involved in a corruption scandal or is mishandling a crisis. 21 The lack of experience and capacity of the delegates also hurts the ability of the NA to perform its oversight function. 22 With each assembly, there is at least 70 percent turnover. This year, only 28 percent of the delegates have previous experience in the NA. Some also believe that the vetting process weeds out the most talented people before they make it to the ballot, a conjecture that we explore in more detail below. 23 The result of this lack of capacity is that the delegates do not ask tough questions and lack the ability, even when they do possess the information, to critique the laws that come through their committees. To this end, the United Nations Development
Programme has since 1976 supported a program to improve the capacity of the delegates, and this year, the Office of the NA with the support of UNDP, inaugurated its Training Center for Elected Representatives (TCER) for freshman delegates.
structure of the national assembly
Like most assemblies, the NA has a hierarchical structure, meaning some delegates are more powerful than others. Nevertheless, the range of power between NA delegates in the leadership and the part-time delegates is wider than in more institutionalized Western legislatures. Importantly, the committee chairs and deputy chairpersons hold considerably more influence within the body than the part-time members. Furthermore, the NASC wields such a preponderance of power over the general body through its ability to independently pass resolutions, organize the elections, and set the agenda of the NA that it is treated by some scholars as a separate central institution within the party-state. 24 The eighteen-member NASC sits between the full NA sessions and can issue ordinances and resolutions on matters assigned to it by the NA. 25 The difference in legal status between ordinances promulgated by the NASC and laws voted on by the NA are not always clear-cut, though most bureaucrats assume that laws take precedence. 26 In the current NASC, twelve of the eighteen delegates are on the Central Committee and the NA chairman, Nguy#n Phú TrCng, is a member of the Politburo, meaning the central VCP is highly integrated into the leadership of the body. The members of the current NASC are nominated by the outgoing NASC.
Aside from the NASC, the assembly hierarchy also divides delegates between full-time and part-time members. Of the 12th NA's 493 members, just over 140 are full-time delegates. The remaining members serve part-time and come to Hà N4i only twice a year for the full NA sessions.
The NA is divided into ten committees, two more than in the 11th NA.
The number of committees in the 12th NA was increased from eight to ten, which reflected the push from the NA to increase its ability to fulfill its oversight role. Previous NA Chairman Nguy#n Ven An was instrumental in this Although this is also true to some extent in elected assemblies in welldeveloped Western democracies, the disparity is more extreme in Vietnam.
Which actors benefit from the disparity is also more predetermined, as will be explained below.
central versus local representation within the national assembly hierarchy
The Constitution stipulates that the NA must be democratically elected, stressing that the delegates should represent not only the districts where they were elected but the nation as a whole. 29 This idea is institutionalized in the 
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individual stakes
The weakness of the NA, the candidate's occupation outside the NA, and his or her likely role within the NA once elected are key factors regarding the incentive to run for the NA. Because candidates are often informed when they are nominated about the role they will hold in the future NA (or because they implicitly understand that role, based on previous norms), they have a good idea of how little power they will have before they are elected.
Furthermore, the NA's relative weakness and the concentration of power within the NA in the hands of a few lower the incentives even more.
Nonetheless, once the candidates are nominated, they have an incentive to win by as high a percentage as possible in order to avoid embarrassment and to signal their popularity to party officials.
For three main reasons, locally nominated candidates have the least incentive to win nomination. First, as Table 1 highlights, locally nominated candidates rarely take leadership roles and have little influence in an institution that is already weak. Second, locally nominated delegates often hold prestigious positions at the provincial level that provide more power and responsibility than that of a delegate. Third, a part-time position on the NA is a low-paying job that may place delegates in the awkward position of having to criticize party or government officials, whom they may look to for future promotions.
Due to the low stakes, some Vietnamese scholars have noted that many delegates, especially those with powerful positions within the provincial governments, only reluctantly accept pressure to run for election to the NA. 31 Salomon notes that candidate selection is "political and bureaucratic" given that many VCP members and high-ranking officials have no interest in running for an assembly where they will be required to engage in potentially contentious oversight duties. 32 While we cannot say whether all candidates reluctantly agree to nomination, anecdotal evidence suggests this was likely
the case for V: Vi!t Ngofn, the general director of Vietcombank, who was selected to run as a delegate from Khánh Hòa Province despite the planned privatization of his bank six months later, for which he worked tirelessly to prepare and from which he would have emerged as the CEO of the largest private bank in Vietnam. 33 The exception to the reluctant locally nominated candidate is the selfnominee, who obviously has personal incentives to run. One incentive for self-nominees is that the NA is the only opportunity for relative outsiders to influence policy making in an officially sanctioned forum. One researcher familiar with several of the self-nominated candidates in H7 Ch5 Minh City said that many candidates wanted to run to raise awareness about waste and corruption in major infrastructure projects. 34 Because self-nominated candidates would not hold leadership positions if elected and would likely be only part-time members, they would perform this function through their capacity to question officials during the two-month sessions where the full body is convened.
Some have also speculated that the incentive for self-nominated candidates such as the prominent businessman A<ng Lê Nguyên V:, founder of the Trung Nguyên Coffee chain, would be to gain access to central government officials-a motivation similar to those identified by scholars studying "businessman candidates" in Russia. 35 Election to the NA could give candidates like A<ng Lê Nguyên V: personal access to the collective leadership (the president, prime minister, VCP general secretary, and NA chair), all of whom are also NA delegates. 36 Centrally nominated candidates have a greater stake in running for office, especially those who are told prior to their nomination that they will hold leadership positions within the NA. Outside of the delegates destined to assume leadership positions, the centrally nominated candidates have an incentive to win by as large a margin as possible in order to signal their popularity and bolster legitimacy. This is particularly true for the government and party leaders, such as the VCP general secretary, the president, and the prime minister, all of whom run for seats on the NA and assume part-time roles on the body. For the lower-level, centrally nominated officials nominated by Office of the NA and the Fatherland Front, the stakes are more complex. The embarrassment of losing is always a factor; however, given placed in which district. The power to chose which candidates run against each other is important to ensuring that the election results achieve the structure determined by the NASC. We will return to this critical coordination between the center and the provincial election officials in discussing ballot creation below. ates from it-or colors outside the lines. The self-nomination process, which generated a great deal of media coverage this year, is slightly different and will be dealt with further below. 39 Step 1: First Negotiation
In the first negotiation, at the central level, the Standing Committee of the Fatherland Front convenes and chairs a meeting to debate the NASC's proposal for the structure, composition, and number of NA candidates from each organization. The meeting essentially finalizes the "numbers" that will be colored in later during the process.
At the provincial level, the provincial Fatherland Front convenes a meeting, usually attended by chairs of the provincial Election Commission. At this meeting, the participants essentially ratify the structure handed down to them in the previous decision from the central level. 40 Step
2: Nomination Process and Meetings with Co-workers
Based on the quotas decided at the first negotiation, the various party, state, and military offices meet to choose candidates based on the quota allotted to them in the first negotiation. This takes place at the central and the local level. At this time, the co-workers of the nominees also vote on whether or not they support the nominee's candidacy. Because most of the nominees are from government and party offices, the nominations and the meetings with co-workers appear to happen at the same time.
Step 3: Second Negotiation-Creating the Preliminary
List of Candidates
In the second negotiation, the Standing Committee of the Central Fatherland Front collects all the nominations and submits a preliminary list of candidates to the Central Election Board and the NASC. The same process is undertaken at the local level, except that the results are sent to the provincial Election Commission, which has the additional responsibility of investigating the self-nominated candidates.
Step 4 up. The process reveals that every step is designed to ensure that the election results adhere to the structure set by the NASC in the first negotiation.
Generating Electoral Districts
The NASC is in charge of creating the election districts. Before the candidate lists are finalized, the NASC decides how many election districts will be assigned to each province, how many candidates will be selected from those 41 In order to improve the appearance of competitiveness, in 2007 the NASC also required that each of these districts had to have at least two more candidates than the number of available seats. 42 We should note here that despite the flaws of the electoral system, the candidateto-seat ratio in Vietnam is far higher than in other single-party state regimes. 
Assigning the Centrally Nominated Candidates
Among the NASC's most important tasks is securing the election of the centrally nominated candidates, because many of these delegates will assume leadership posts within the NA. Centrally nominated candidates must compete directly with locally nominated candidates, and therefore the Central Election Board needs to distribute the nominees to provinces across the country. To provide centrally nominated candidates with the best chance of winning, they do not run against each other in the same district. The process of deciding where each nominee goes depends on the needs of the party, the wishes of the candidate, and negotiations between the Central Election Board and the provincial Election Commissions. As we will show below, where these candidates are placed can be critical to their ability to win election.
Centrally nominated candidates are asked to list four locations, in order of preference, where they would like to run. In both of our interviews with sitting NA delegates, the provinces they were eventually sent to were not on their wish lists. Other observers downplay the significance of the regional placement of central nominees, and opinions vary widely about the significance of particular provinces for the probability of election. Some interviewees conjectured that it was harder to be elected in the major cities because the level of education is higher, while others said the election difficulties were primarily split on a north/south basis. In the end, the Central Election Board, which is set up by the NASC, chooses where the delegates are sent in consultation with both the candidates (for what it's worth) and the provinces in question.
Creating Candidate Lists
Once the central candidates are assigned to provinces, the provincial Election Commissions have the responsibility of creating the ballots. This step of deciding which candidates compete against whom and in what districts is especially important in ensuring that the election leads to the desired structure set by the NASC. This stage also gives the provinces the greatest chance to paint outside the lines of the structure set by the NASC. However, the ability of the provinces to do so must not be overstated, given that the Central Election Board and the NASC have considerable influence over the provincial Election Commissions.
Vietnamese voters face ballots with four, five, or six names, depending on which district they are in (see the examples in Table 2 ). As noted above, in As is obvious from the ballots in Table 2 , the differing number of candidates within districts means it is mathematically easier to be elected from certain districts than from others. Out of 182 districts, there were 12 six-candidate districts (50 percent chance of winning), 123 five-candidate districts (60 percent chance of winning), and 47 four-candidate districts (50 percent chance of winning). The five-candidate districts obviously give the candidates the greatest chance of victory ( Table 2 ). Not surprisingly, the high-profile candidates such as the prime minister, the president, and party general secretary all ran in five-candidate districts. Furthermore, because candidates must receive at least 50 percent of the vote to win election, it is mathematically more possible in a six-candidate district to come in third place and fail to win. In 2007, this actually occurred in seven districts with six candidates. This makes the six-candidate districts the most difficult in which to win a seat.
T A B L E T W O :

Examples of Electoral District Compositions
Interestingly, all except one of H7 Ch5 Minh City's districts were either four-for-two districts (i.e., four candidates for two seats) or six-for-three dis-
tricts. The only five-for-three district was the district in which President
Nguy#n Minh Tri!t was running. It is unclear why H7 Ch5 Minh City's Electoral Commission would want to have so many six-for-three districts (seven out of nine) when this could potentially reduce the number of local delegates it sends to the NA. One possible explanation is that the city had eight self-nominated candidates, more than any other province. Because these self-nominees were not included in the structure determined in the first negotiation, they had to be added to the ballot as extra candidates.
Whatever the reason, the end result was that in three of its nine districts, only two out of the six candidates won, meaning that even though H7 Ch5 Minh City was allotted twenty-six seats, it wound up with only twenty-three after the election.
Although the provincial Election Commissions are officially in charge of creating the ballots once the nominees are in place, the Central Election
Board most likely has a high degree of control over the selection. According to a Vietnamese political scientist familiar with the electoral system in Vietnam, the provincial Election Commissions assign candidates to election district ballots under the supervision of the Central Election Board in order to achieve the structure set by the NASC. 47 Furthermore, the NASC and the Central Election Board have a strong influence on the shape of the provinces' initial delegation structures set in the first negotiation. This influence also shapes the decision making of the local Election Commissions when they create the ballots, as they want to ensure that the election gives a result close to that predetermined structure.
The ambiguity inherent in ensuring that the "right" candidate wins gives the provinces some leeway. For instance, the leadership clearly wants the centrally nominated candidates to win, and so the provinces cannot create a district in which two centrally nominated candidates compete against each other. However, depending on the level of autonomy of the province and the influence of the candidate, the provincial Election Commissions could place certain candidates in districts with more competitive local nominees, thus threatening the preferred candidate and the planned national structure.
According to a Vietnamese political scientist we interviewed, the criteria for determining which candidate should run in which district is "flexible" Stacking districts to enhance the chances for election of these professionals has been cited as a particular tactic to ensure their representation in future assemblies.
P A I N T -B Y -N U M B E R S D E M O C R A C Y campaigning
Once the candidates are assigned to their districts and the final ballots are drawn up, the candidates have about one month to meet with voters and discuss their platforms. The candidates hold as many as fifteen to twenty meetings with the voters, organized by the Fatherland Front, prior to election day. According to Gainsborough, the voters at these meetings ask a wide array of questions, some of which are challenging. He notes that this is an important avenue for the party to gauge important issues that could cause discontent among the population. 51 Thayer also remarks on the seriousness with which local constituencies took this process in the most recent election. 52 The candidates are encouraged not to spend their own money on the campaigns, and evidence shows that they rarely do. 53 Gainsborough notes that there is no preferential coverage in the local media for the different candidates, regardless of their connection to the center. This may be true for the local coverage, which was the focus of his research. However, several well-known self-nominated candidates, such as A<ng Hùng Võ and A<ng Ven Khoa, received substantial coverage from the national media, particularly Tuvi Tr^and VnExpress, both of which are available in all provinces and are more widely read than the local papers. 54 This might have influenced their prospects for election had they made it to the final ballot.
election day
Regarding the actual election, it is difficult to assess just how fair it was.
Despite the fact that voting is a right but not mandatory, In looking at the process and the outcome of the Vietnamese election, the most critical moment was the first negotiation, before any candidates were even officially nominated. According to the plan presented by the NASC at the meeting on February 24, 2007, the final ballot for the 12th NA was to have 167 centrally nominated candidates, of which most would be nominated by the office of the NA. The structure was also more detailed, including targets for the amount of women, ethnic minorities, non-party candidates, and more. The structure also set quotas for how many candidates would be nominated by each central nominating institution.
As Table 3 shows, the composition of the assembly that was elected looks strikingly similar to the structure proposed by the NASC before any candidates' names were officially put forward. The NASC structure also reveals Overall, Table 3 shows that the composition of the NA is largely determined by the pre-nomination structure proposed by the NASC. News articles from the state media suggest that the structure is actually far more detailed than the numbers presented in Table 3 . They hint that the NASC actually gives a target figure for how many business experts, scientists, journalists, total Fatherland Front officials from the local and central level, members from the party and state offices, and others should be included in the NA. For instance, one article revealed that the proposed structure would make space for four scientists and five business experts. 60 Another article mentioned that the overall structure called for ninety-one Fatherland Front officials to be elected, including thirty-four from the central level and fiftyseven from the local levels. 61 Some critics within the Fatherland Front complained about this after the first negotiation, saying that the vetting and nomination process was more about introducing the entire NA than introducing individual candidates. 62 Given that almost 70 percent of the delegates are nominated and vetted at the provincial level, the National Fatherland Front, the Central Election Board, and the NASC must work in close connection with the provincial a Possibly because the structure was up for debate, the breakdown of the centrally nominated candidates does not exactly equal the 167 (one-third of 500) set aside for central nominees.
b The actual structure listed 84 to 85. Election Commissions to ensure that the final assembly is close to the desired structure. The nomination, vetting, and negotiation processes appear primarily designed to guarantee that outcome. While the Fatherland Front and the negotiations do play a key role in determining which individuals will represent the various constituencies, at a broad level the vetting process is primarily a coordination mechanism between the Central Election Board and the local Election Commissions to come up with an elected legislature that fits the predetermined structure.
Communication to the local level from the Central Election Board goes through the chairs of the Election Commissions. In A7ng Nai, Ngh0 An, and Thái Bình provinces, the chairs of the three negotiations also chaired the provincial Election Commissions. In each case, these chairs were also either chairs or deputy chairpersons of the People's Committee or People's Councils. 63 They presided over a board that included members from the provincial party apparatus.
As we have seen, after the first negotiation at the provincial level, the leaders of the meetings, with direction from the NASC and the Central Election Board, also finalize a structure. A brief analysis of a few provinces, where proposed structures were available, suggests that they were intended to achieve the overall composition proposed by the NA. Each provincial structure included a significant party leader and a member of the local government. Because each province was allotted a full-time NA delegate, they also were supposed to select someone to fill that post. Beyond that, each province's structure varied slightly. Not all provincial media outlets clearly published the results of the first negotiation, and therefore we were not able to gain an aggregate dataset of all the provincial structures. However, some provinces, such as A7ng Nai and Ngh0 An, did publish the results of the first negotiation, providing insight into how successful they were in achieving their predetermined goals.
Both A7ng Nai and Ngh0 An's proposals after the first negotiation included one key provincial leader. However, Ngh0 An also set aside positions for a member of the Fatherland Front and a judge. A7ng Nai, however, did not explicitly set aside a position for a Fatherland Front official, but it did allot one position for a union leader and another for a local tax official, among others. 64 Once the structures for the provinces were set, the provincial Election Commissions coordinated with the Central Election Board to create ballots that gave the "right" candidates the best chance to win. This was done by placing several candidates from the interest group or demographic needed in the same district to increase the chances that one would be elected. For example, in A7ng Nai, where the structure called for the election of a tax official, H7 Ven Nam, the deputy procurator, was elected from a district that also included chief procurator Tr6n Huy Hùng, who lost. The two were almost certainly selected for the same district (a five-for-three district) in order to make certain that at least one was chosen and thus fulfill the proposed structure. Unlike an electoral system with single-member districts, the A7ng Nai Electoral Board did not need to worry about splitting support for a favored candidate. Supporters of tax officials could select both. By placing them in the same district, they simply increased the relative probability of a tax official grabbing one of the top three slots. 
P A I N T -B Y -N U M B E R S D E M O C R A C Y
Predictably, the Fatherland Front leadership was critical of the proposed structure. However, the Fatherland Front was opposed to more than its loss of nominees. It was also critical of the NASC for not including more nonparty members. The structure called for 10 percent, while the Fatherland Front wanted at least 20 percent. It was also openly critical of the NASC's failure to provide space in the structure for more self-nominated candidates.
The Fatherland Front pressed its case between the first and second negotiation and managed to win an increase of two delegates for the front. However, it did not significantly alter the number of self-nominated or non-party candidates in the structure. In January, 2008, Prime Minister Nguy#n T(n D:ng seemed to try and smooth over any lingering resentments from the election process when he appeared before a Fatherland Front Standing Committee working session to praise the front for its efforts to promote democracy. 65 provincial deviations from the structure While the results for Ngh0 An and A7ng Nai provinces, and for the election overall, show that the NASC largely succeeded in achieving its predetermined structure, there were notable exceptions that reveal important insights about the nature of center-province relations. First, 4 percent more locally nominated candidates were elected than was anticipated by the NASC's design. In particular, wealthier provinces appeared to be more likely to stray from the structure defined by the center, favoring local representatives over central nominees.
Because information was not available on the exact structures for every province, we could not reach this conclusion by comparing the provinces based on the total election results. However, we do know that the Central Election Board intended for all of the centrally nominated candidates to win and that those who lost ran predominately in wealthier, southern provinces.
All interviewees and several officials were notably surprised at the unprecedented number of centrally nominated candidates who lost this year.
Indeed, the Election Board Secretary, in his postmortem of the election, lamented the fact that so many centrally nominated candidates lost because it was going to throw off the structure and lead to the underrepresentation of certain constituencies. 66 As Table 4 shows, no centrally nominated candidate lost in a province with a per capita GDP below the national median. Moreover, on the list only An Giang Province, which is quite rich by national standards, is not a net donor to the national budget. Every other province on the table receives significantly less than the national median in central transfers and contributes at least some portion of shared revenue back to the center to aid transfers to other provinces. These provinces are more autonomous, relatively more powerful than their peers in national debates, and possess wealthier voters who might be more likely to resist central directives. 67 The fact that most of the centrally nominated candidates who lost ran in the south, particularly in provinces that contribute money to the central government, reveals that either voters were more independent minded in those regions or that, anticipating failure, the Election Board put these candidates in less favorable districts. It has also been suggested that the Election Commissions in these provinces were less receptive to pressure from the center and placed the centrally nominated candidates in districts where they would face real fights. 68 More research is necessary to sort out these competing hypotheses.
The Problem of Self-nominated Candidates and the Proposed Structure Why risk having self-nominated candidates if they will only draw unwarranted attention and potentially make the structure more difficult to attain?
Part of the answer lies in the VCP's genuine goal of having the NA provide a check on the government and the realization that party members and bureaucrats are unlikely to perform this task. Former NA Chairman
Nguy#n Ven An wrote a three-part series on the role of the VCP as a leader, the role of democracy in Vietnamese politics, and the role of the NA as a reflection of democracy. 69 In his article on the NA, he raised the issue of whether a VCP member, who must be responsible to the party leadership, can also effectively oversee government officials, most of whom are also party members. He said that NA delegates have two parallel responsibilities:
to support the VCP and to oversee the government. These roles, he claims,
are not fundamentally at odds. Nevertheless, he later notes that NA delegates with higher stature in the VCP and government are less likely to aggressively challenge the government. 70 One Vietnamese researcher also noted that the more vocal members of the NA were the professors and lower level officials, presumably without as much to lose by voicing their opinions. 71 This is likely because the loyalties of high-ranking officials lie with the party and state bodies that they are supposedly overseeing in their capacity as NA delegates.
In theory, the self-nominated candidates should improve this conflict of interests because they should have fewer ties to the government they are meant to oversee. However, no seats were designated to them in the initial structure put forward by the NASC, which effectively meant that no matter how many self-nominated candidates there were, few were destined to win.
As Fatherland Front Chairman Phfm Th! Duy0t said after the NASC submitted its plan for the 12th NA: "With this structure, people do not know where self-nominated candidates should sit." 72 He knew then what others would find out later: no matter how many self-nominated candidates there were, few were destined to win because the structure did not provide for them. The NASC structure, not the nomination and election process, is the key determinant in the composition of the NA.
how the self-nominated candidates lost
Despite the leadership's failure to make space for the self-nominated candidates in the structure, 236 candidates nationwide still submitted complete applications before the deadline and went through at least part of the five-step process described above. How then did the system whittle away these selfnominated candidates to ensure that the ballot and the election would result in the structure proposed from the beginning? The self-nominated candidates were culled in three main ways. First, some self-nominated candidates, particularly party members, withdrew. Although few publicly admitted to being pressured into withdrawing, several interviewees said this was likely the case. Second, some candidates failed to secure 50 percent support from their local voters in Step 4 of the election process and did not make it to the final ballot. Third, voters themselves rejected twenty-nine of the thirty candidates that did make it to the ballot. Ven Khoa in VietnamNet, the journalist noted that he had the support of many people across the country who would be willing to work for him for free if he were elected. A<ng Ven Khoa simply replied that the burden of being an NA delegate would be too great. 74 In all, by March 27, before the second negotiation, more than twentyone self-nominated candidates in H7 Ch5 Minh City alone withdrew their nominations. Several said they were suddenly too busy, while another said after self-examination he realized he did not have the qualifications to be a delegate. 75 Many of the candidates also failed to win the support of their local voters.
This The voters of dân phF 5, khu phF 1, P27 Q. Bình Thfnh shared their opinions and voted on Tr6n Anh Tu(n (a self-nominated candidate). The voters said that Tu(n's CV was unclear, including whether or not he served his mandatory service in the army when he was 16. Tu(n's advanced degree in politics is also in question, because up until that point he worked in a different field. Tu(n is currently unemployed. His family did not show up to the meeting because they were embarrassed by his candidacy. Due to the reasons above, Tu(n only received 7 out of 34 votes supporting his candidacy and 27 out of 34 not in support. According to most of the voters, he is not worthy of running for the NA. 76 Like Tr6n Anh Tu(n, many others did not make the final ballot after failing to win more than 50 percent support in meetings with the neighborhood voters. It is unclear whether these candidates did not have the requisite capabilities to hold office, or whether the voters might have been cajoled into rejecting them.
While the withdrawals, the vetting, and the neighborhood votes of confidence weeded out some of the candidates, thirty did eventually contest the ballot nationwide. However, even then they fared remarkably poorly, with only one winning election. One of the most famous self-nominated candidates to make the final ballot and lose was A<ng Lê Nguyên V:, president of Trung Nguyên Coffee, a coffee chain as ubiquitous in Vietnam as Starbucks Regardless of the manner in which the self-nominees were vetted, withdrew, or not elected, the striking reality is that even given so much hype, only one out of 236 self-nominees won. No single explanation can be given for why so many self-nominated candidates failed to reach the final ballot.
However, given the final election result's close correlation to the NASC proposed structure, the inclusion of so many self-nominated candidates on the ballot would have given the central leadership less control over its composition. As the leader of the Fatherland Front said, the structure provided no seats for the self-nominated candidates. Therefore, they would have to be eliminated from the final ballot one way or another in to guarantee that they did not corrupt the structure.
Conclusions
The analysis in this article provides a description of the legal electoral process as well as an analysis of how that process played out in the 2007 election. Given the stakes of winning election, the structure of the NA, and the results of the 2007 election, we can draw two important conclusions about the level of central control over the NA.
First, despite the unprecedented rejection of the centrally nominated candidates and the ability for self-nominated candidates to run for office, the NA is still not a truly representative and competitively elected body, and thus its ability to oversee the government will continue to be compromised. The ability of the central and local election officials to coordinate and successfully achieve the predetermined structure of the NA shows that they still retain a great deal of control over the election outcome. Furthermore, the extreme hierarchy within the NA means that the locally nominated delegates have little to no power within the institution. For this reason, the delegates with the closest connection to the constituents that elected them have little influence once they are elected. The failure of the self-nominated candidates to win election also shows that those with the most motivation to run for office and the incentive to take their job seriously are being shut out.
This compromises the degree to which the candidates represent their constituencies and also their capability or desire to challenge the government and party.
Second, we conclude that the 2007 election provides useful information about center-provincial relations and the relationship between the VCP and the Fatherland Front. Although we will pursue this question further in future work, preliminary evidence shows that wealthier, donor provinces appeared to have greater success in deviating from the structure set by the NASC and Central Election Board than those more beholden to the center.
The findings can be taken as a positive signal of the rise of political consciousness in Vietnam, but the regional concentration and the potential political conflict over transfers that the results highlight are more worrisome. 
